




The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

April 13, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR ENERGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

FROM: SPENCER ABRAHAM 

SUBJECT: Safeguards, Security and Counterintelligence Policy Review

I am committed to assuring that the Department's security and counterintelligence efforts are up to the task of protecting our classified data and special nuclear materials. On January 18, 2001, both Under Secretaries were directed to review recent policies issued in the areas of Safeguards and Security and Counterintelligence (Attachment 1). I support these reviews and have directed that they be concluded not later than July 23, 2001.

In the interim, I am issuing the following direction which serves to both clarify and amend the prior guidance.

1. All Safeguards and Security and Counterintelligence policies formally issued will continue to be implemented without delay. Requests for deviation from any of these policies may be made via existing processes.
2. The Director, Office of Security and Emergency Operations and the Director, Counterintelligence will certify that the policies which are currently in place, including those expired or which will expire during the next 12 months, do not contravene any law or regulation and are appropriate for Departmental use. Extensions will be granted according to schedules developed by the Directors of those organizations in conjunction with Management and Administration.
3. While the January 18, 2001, memorandum specified only the laboratories, I am expanding the scope to include all Departmental sites and activities covered by the policies under review. All program offices which have responsibility for these sites should be included in the review process.



4. No new Safeguards and Security and Counterintelligence directives or policies, or substantive revisions to existing directive or policies, will be processed until after the reviews are completed in July. Safeguards and Security and Counterintelligence directives or policies currently in the directives or field management council review processes, other than those listed on Attachment 2, are to be withdrawn. The only exceptions are a number of Safeguards and Security policies which have completed the comment resolution process (Attachment 2). Barring any last minute problems, I intend to issue these policies. They are to be implemented immediately, subject to funding availability.
5. If, in the course of the review, an unforeseen Safeguards and Security and Counterintelligence vulnerability is identified the relevant Offices shall be informed and appropriate action taken immediately to mitigate the vulnerability.
6. The Deputy Secretary and both Under Secretaries shall convene no later than July 23, 2001, to review the findings and recommendations of the appointed groups. The Director, Security and Emergency Operations and the Director, Counterintelligence shall present their views on the findings and recommendations. The Deputy Secretary will, in consultation with me, make any necessary decisions and establish a schedule for updating Safeguards and Security and Counterintelligence policies.

Jim Powers (MA-4; 6-7438) is the point of contact on this activity and any questions should be referred to him. As an integral part of the Department's missions, it is imperative to have appropriate security and counterintelligence measures in effect. Thank you for your support in accomplishing this objective.

Attachments



The Secretary of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

January 18, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR: UNDER SECRETARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR ENERGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SECURITY AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

FROM: BILL RICHARDSON *BR*

SUBJECT: Response to Interim Assessment of Science and Security at DOE Laboratories

In response to the interim assessment of science and security at the laboratories provided to me on January 11, 2001, by Dr. John Hamre (CEO, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Chair of Commission on Science and Security), I am directing the Under Secretary for National Security and the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment, to take the following actions:

1. Charter an Implementation Review Conference to assess the impacts of existing security and counterintelligence orders on the scientific and security environment at the laboratories.
 - All affected parties (labs, field and headquarters) should participate in the review
 - The conference will review existing and draft policies and procedures and provide recommendations for developing graded policies for the Tier I, II, and III laboratories
 - The review will include an evaluation of orders on foreign visits and assignments, CRADA participation, e-mail monitoring procedures
 - The review will make recommendations for clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the lab directors in approving foreign visits and assignments
 - The review will be completed within six months



2. Suspend implementation of draft security or CI policies and procedures until the Implementation Review Conference has completed an assessment, which has been implemented through the Field Management Council
3. Charter a Task Force to review Design-Basis Threat (DBT) and implementation of DBT in evaluating security at the national laboratories.
 - DBT Task Force should include relevant interagency participants (e.g., DoD, NRC, and other Nuclear Steering Group Members) and DOE lab, field and headquarters representatives
 - Task Force should assess implementation of current DBT at the labs and report findings within three months
 - Task Force should provide an evaluation of and/or recommendations to the DBT within six months
4. Charter a Task Force to analyze "sensitive but unclassified" (SBU) information classifications
 - Task Force should include representatives from lab, field, and headquarters
 - Task Force will assess rationale for and implementation of SBU policies across the laboratory complex and impact of these policies on scientific exchange and security
 - Report results within three months
5. Reinforce support for National Academy of Sciences review of polygraphs
 - Encourage NAS to conduct the study in a timely manner and/or provide interim reports to DOE

I have directed these actions to strengthen the scientific and security environment at the DOE national laboratories. The Commission on Science and Security will complete its study by March 2002 and will provide regular updates to the Under Secretaries on its findings. I expect all affected parties (lab, field, and headquarters) to be fully involved in implementing these actions.

ATTACHMENT 2

Safeguards and Security and Counterintelligence Policies That Will Complete the Review Process and be Implemented

1. DOE P 470.X, Integrated Safeguards and Security Management Policy (FMC Action 283-SO-00).
2. DOE N 471.X, Reporting Incidents of Security Concern (FMC Action 290-SO-00).
3. DOE Manual 471.2-1C, Classified Matter Protection and Control (FMC Action 307-SO-01).
4. Rulemaking Summary: Amendment to PSAP Rule, 10 CFR Part 710 (FMC Action 310-SO-01).
5. DOE M 472.1-1X, Personnel Security Program Manual (currently in REV/COM review).
6. DOE M 473.2-1A, Firearms Qualification Courses Manual (currently in REV/COM review).
7. DOE P 205.X Departmental Cyber Security Management Program Policy (FMC Action 276-SO-00).